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Doré: All That Glitters Is Not Gold
Christopher D. Bredt and Ewa Krajewska*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Doré v. Barreau du Québec,1 the Supreme Court of Canada not
only confirmed the long line of case law that administrative tribunals
must make decisions in accordance with the Charter,2 it went a step
further by mandating that administrative tribunals exercise their
discretion in accordance with Charter values.
In this paper we first place Doré in context by providing background on
the relationship between the Charter and administrative tribunals generally.
Second, we summarize the divergent streams in the jurisprudence that existed
prior to Doré on how administrative tribunals should exercise their discretion
in accordance with the Charter. Specifically, up until Doré there was a debate
in the jurisprudence on whether an Oakes3 framework or an administrative
law framework should govern the analysis. Third, we summarize and
discuss the Court’s decision in Doré. Fourth, we discuss the genesis and
development of Charter values. The purpose of discussing this genesis is to
situate the Doré decision in the development of the jurisprudence around
Charter values. Finally, we critique the Doré framework.
The substance of the critique is as follows. First, the scope and
essence of Charter values are ill defined. For example, while in Doré the
Charter value at issue was freedom of expression, which has a
corresponding Charter right whose scope is well defined in the case law,
other values, such as human dignity or autonomy, do not have analogous
rights and therefore are not jurisprudentially defined. The nebulous
nature of Charter values will, in our view, lead to difficulties in the
application of the proportionality analysis. As part of this critique, we
Christopher D. Bredt is a partner and Chair of Borden Ladner Gervais’ National Public
Law Group. Ewa Krajewska is an associate at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. We would like to thank
Alice Melcov, an articling student at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, for her research assistance.
1
[2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
*
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also question whether the standard of review of reasonableness is
appropriate in the circumstances. Finally, there are practical implications
of the Doré decision that have been left unaddressed. In particular, it is
unclear who bears the onus in the different stages of the proportionality
analysis and what evidentiary foundation will be required to demonstrate
that a Charter value is at issue and that one has been infringed.

II. BACKGROUND ON THE CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
In order to properly understand Doré and the new framework it
mandates, it is important to contrast it with the legal frameworks that already
exist for administrative tribunals to give effect to and apply Charter rights.
The three established frameworks that already govern are as follows:
(1) granting a section 52 or section 24(1) remedy when a statute or
regulation is unconstitutional;
(2) interpreting a statute or regulation to be Charter compliant; and
(3) exercising discretion in accordance with Charter rights or values.
1. Challenging a Statute or Regulation as Unconstitutional
In R. v. Conway,4 the Supreme Court of Canada reformulated and
simplified the test for when an administrative tribunal is “a court of
competent jurisdiction” to consider constitutional questions (section 52
of the Constitution Act, 19825) and to grant Charter remedies (section 24
of the Charter). In doing so, the Supreme Court simplified the law in this
area by making the primary consideration whether the administrative
tribunal can consider questions of law.
Prior to Conway, different tests were applied to determine whether a
tribunal had jurisdiction under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982
and section 24(1) of the Charter. Thus, the analysis depended on the
nature of the Charter question at issue:
(1) If an applicant submitted that the tribunal should find a legislative
provision constitutionally invalid or inapplicable, then the analysis
under section 52 applied.

4
5

[2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”].
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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(2) If an applicant requested that the tribunal provide a personal remedy
on the basis that his or her Charter rights had been infringed, then the
analysis under section 24(1) applied.
However, as the jurisprudence developed, the two tests began to
overlap. In particular, the test for jurisdiction under section 24(1) came to
incorporate many of the same factors that were considered under the test
for jurisdiction under section 52. Accordingly, it was rare for a tribunal
to have jurisdiction to grant a remedy for a Charter violation under
section 24(1) if it did not also have jurisdiction to consider whether a
legislative provision was constitutional under section 52.
After reviewing the evolution of the jurisprudence on the power of
administrative tribunals to consider Charter issues, in Conway the Court
set out the following test for whether an administrative tribunal can grant
a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter:
(1) Does the administrative tribunal have jurisdiction, explicit or
implicit, to decide questions of law? If it does, and unless it is
clearly demonstrated that the legislature intended to exclude the
Charter from the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal is a court of
competent jurisdiction and can consider and apply the Charter —
and Charter remedies — when resolving the matters properly
before it.6
(2) If the answer to the first question is affirmative, the remaining
question is whether the tribunal can grant the particular remedy
sought, given the relevant statutory scheme. At issue will be whether
the remedy sought is the kind of remedy that the legislature intended
to fit within the statutory framework of the tribunal. Relevant
considerations will include the tribunal’s statutory mandate, structure
and function.7
An overarching theme in Conway was the Court’s acceptance that
administrative tribunals should play a primary role in determining
Charter issues falling within their jurisdiction. The decision could be said
to fall within a general trend affirming the power of administrative
tribunals and respecting their decision-making (as seen in Dunsmuir v.

6
7

Conway, supra, note 4, at para. 81.
Id., at para. 82.
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New Brunswick,8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa9 and
Bell Canada v. Bell Aliant Regional Communications 10).
Significantly, and perhaps anticipating Doré, Abella J. wrote that
tribunals can vindicate a claimant’s Charter rights by exercising their
regular statutory powers and processes in ways that accord with Charter
values. Justice Abella wrote:
Remedies granted to redress Charter wrongs are intended to
meaningfully vindicate a claimant’s rights and freedoms. ... Yet it is not
the case that effective, vindicatory remedies for harm flowing from
unconstitutional conduct are available only through separate and
distinct Charter applications. ... Charter rights can be effectively
vindicated through the exercise of statutory powers and processes. ... In
this case, it may well be that the substance of Mr. Conway’s complaint
about where his room is located can be fully addressed within the
framework of the Board’s statutory mandate and the exercise of its
11
discretion in accordance with Charter values.

2. Interpreting a Statute or Regulation so that It Is Constitutional
There is an established framework for a court or tribunal to interpret
a statute or regulation in order for it to be constitutional. The Supreme
Court has rejected the proposition that statutes should automatically be
interpreted into conformity with Charter values. Charter values are
relevant to statutory interpretation only where the statute is ambiguous
and reference to a Charter value would help resolve the ambiguity.12
Most recently, the Supreme Court confirmed this approach in R. v.
Clarke,13 in which the accused did not directly challenge the
constitutionality of sentencing legislation but argued instead that the
provision was ambiguous and that the appropriate exercise involved
the application of Charter values. Justice Abella, for the Court, reiterated
that statutory ambiguity is a prerequisite to the application of Charter
values when interpreting legislation.14
[2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”].
[2009] S.C.J. No. 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R.. 339 (S.C.C.).
[2009] S.C.J. No. 40, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 764 (S.C.C.).
11
Conway, supra, note 4, at para. 103 (emphasis added).
12
Bell ExpressuVu v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 61-66
(S.C.C.); Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 31,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 539, at para. 48 (S.C.C.).
13
[2014] S.C.J. No. 100, 2014 SCC 28 (S.C.C.).
14
Id., at para. 15.
8
9

10
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3. Where a Statute or Regulation Is Not Contrary to the Charter,
but Grants Discretion to the Decision-maker
An example of this kind of use of the Charter can be found in
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General).15 In that case, a law
authorizing the Medical Services Commission to fund certain health
services was found not to violate the Charter, but the exercise of
discretion by the Commission not to fund interpreters for deaf patients
was found to be unconstitutional.
The decision in Doré falls under this last category. Mr. Doré did not
challenge the constitutionality of the Code of Ethics under which he was
reprimanded. Nor did he challenge the length of the suspension he
received. The issue was whether the Barreau du Québec exercised its
discretion in accordance with Charter values by reprimanding Mr. Doré
for the letter he had sent.

III. THE TENSION BETWEEN AN OAKES FRAMEWORK AND AN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FRAMEWORK
Until Doré there were two strands of jurisprudence on how
administrative tribunals and reviewing courts should assess whether an
administrative decision-maker exercised discretion in accordance with
the Charter. Initially, the jurisprudence dictated that an Oakes analysis
was appropriate. More recently, a number of cases have suggested that an
administrative law framework was better suited to the tribunal context. In
Doré, the Court reviewed this jurisprudential history and settled on the
administrative law framework. However, it is clear from the new
framework set out in Doré that the idea of proportionality underlying the
Oakes test will nevertheless continue to play a significant role.
The first time the Supreme Court considered whether an
administrative tribunal’s discretionary decision accorded with the Charter
was in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson.16 The issue in the case
was the remedial discretion in the Labour Code that allowed adjudicators
to resolve grievances under collective agreements. In Slaight, the
adjudicator ordered, among other things, that the employee be reinstated
and that the company, a radio station, give the employee a letter of
reference of specified content and refrain from saying anything further
15
16

[1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.).
[1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Slaight”].
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about the employee. The company challenged the labour adjudicator’s
decision on the ground that it infringed its freedom of expression under
section 2(b) of the Charter.
Justice Lamer (as he then was), in concurring reasons, held that the
Charter applied to a labour adjudicator’s decision and used the section 1
framework developed in Oakes17 to determine whether the decision
complied with the Charter. Justice Lamer wrote:
The test that must be applied in such an assessment has been largely
defined by my brother Dickson C.J. in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
103. According to that test, the objective to be served by the disputed
measures must first be sufficiently important to warrant limiting a right
or freedom protected by the Charter. Second, the party seeking to
maintain the limitation must show that the means selected to attain this
objective are reasonable and justifiable. To do this, it will be necessary
to apply a form of proportionality test involving three separate
components: the disputed measures must be fair and not arbitrary,
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally
connected to that objective. The means chosen must also be such as to
impair the right or freedom as little as possible, and finally, its effects
18
must be proportional to the objective sought.

Justice Lamer adopted the Oakes framework instead of the general
administrative law framework for the review of discretionary decisions.
He rejected the latter as, in his view, it did not have the appropriate tools
to evaluate the legality of discretionary decisions challenged on the basis
of Charter arguments because it did not allow a court “to examine [the]
appropriateness [of a discretionary decision] or … substitute its own
opinion for that of the person making the order”.19
Chief Justice Dickson, in concurring reasons, also preferred the
Oakes analysis. In his view, the administrative law standard is less
onerous than section 1 and it “rests to a large extent on unarticulated and
undeveloped values and lacks the same degree of structure and
sophistication of analysis”.20

17

Supra, note 3.
Slaight, supra, note 16, at 1081.
19
Id., at 1074; see also Geneviève Cartier, “The Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Administrative Law – The Case of Discretion”
[hereinafter “Cartier”] in David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Portland, OR: Hart, 2004)
61, at 68.
20
Slaight, id., at 1049.
18
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Justice Abella in Doré notes that the approach in Slaight attracted
academic concern from administrative law scholars.21 For example,
Professor Geneviève Cartier wrote that the Court’s opinion expressed a
“hierarchical view” of the relationship between administrative law and
the Charter. The role of administrative law was “reduced to one of formal
determination of jurisdiction on the basis of statutory interpretation, and
it does not have the ability to deal with issues of fundamental values”.22
The main critique was that the Court should not have bypassed
administrative law in favour of the Charter.23
The notion that an administrative tribunal should take into account
Charter values was first captured in Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),24 in which L’Heureux-Dubé J. concluded
that administrative decision-makers were required to take into account
fundamental Canadian values, including those in the Charter, when
exercising their discretion.25
The conflict between the Slaight strand of jurisprudence and the
Baker strand of jurisprudence came to a head in Multani v. Commission
scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.26 The issue in that case involved the
discretionary decision of a school board to prohibit a Sikh student from
wearing his kirpan to school. The student and his family challenged the
decision of the school board as an infringement of his freedom of
religion. While the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the board’s
decision, it split 6:2 on whether a Charter or administrative law analysis
applied.
Justice Charron, for the majority, applied the Charter analysis. She
held that the school board’s decision infringed the student’s freedom of
religion and that the infringement could not be justified under section 1.
Justice LeBel wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing that the
Charter analysis was appropriate but proposing that the section 1 analysis
be modified in cases involving administrative discretion.
Justices Abella and Deschamps held that an administrative law
analysis applied because the decision being assessed was an administrative
decision rather than a law, regulation or other similar rule of general
See, for example, J.M. Evans, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution
and the Common Law” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 51, at 74; Cartier, supra, note 19, at 68.
22
Cartier, id.
23
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 27.
24
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.).
25
Id., at paras. 53-56.
26
[2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.).
21
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application. They reviewed the school board’s decision on a standard of
reasonableness and found it unreasonable in disregarding Multani’s
freedom of religion.
We turn now to a discussion of Doré, where Abella J. for a unanimous
Court, determined that the administrative law analysis should be adopted
rather than the Oakes approach.

IV. DORÉ — HOW DOES AN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKER
APPLY CHARTER VALUES IN THE EXERCISE OF STATUTORY
DISCRETION?
1. Factual Background
At issue in Doré was the Barreau du Québec’s decision to reprimand
a lawyer for the content of a letter he wrote to a judge after a court
proceeding. The lawyer did not challenge the constitutionality of the
Code of Ethics under which he was reprimanded. Nor did he challenge
the length of the suspension he received. He challenged the
constitutionality of the decision of the Barreau du Québec itself, claiming
that it violated his freedom of expression under the Charter.27
Interestingly, in the courts below, including the Superior Court and
the Court of Appeal, the case was framed as an infringement of
Mr. Doré’s right to freedom of expression.28 It was only at the Supreme
Court level that the decision was written to discuss Charter values
instead of rights.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Abella J. framed the issue raised by
the case as how to protect Charter guarantees and the values they reflect
in the context of an adjudicated administrative decision. Normally, if a
discretionary decision is made by an adjudicator within his or her
mandate, that decision will be reviewed for its reasonableness. The
question is whether the presence of a Charter issue calls for the
replacement of the administrative law framework with the Oakes
analysis.
After reviewing the history of the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue,
in her decision in Doré, Abella J. noted that the academic commentary
that followed Multani was consistently critical. It argued that the use of a
27

Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 2.
See Doré v. Tribunal des professions, [2008] Q.J. No. 5222, 2008 QCCS 2450 (Que.
S.C.) and Doré v. Bernard, [2010] Q.J. No. 88, 2010 QCCA 24 (Que. C.A.).
28
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strict section 1 analysis reduced administrative law to having a formal
role in controlling the exercise of discretion.29 Justice Abella concluded
that the Oakes analysis should be rejected in favour of an administrative
law approach. She outlined the appropriate standard of review for this
kind of decision and then set out a new proportionality framework
designed to guide parties and decision-makers.
2. Standard of Review
On the issue of the standard of review, Abella J. held that deference
will be appropriate even when Charter values are at issue so long as the
administrative decision-maker has the requisite expertise. She conceded
that there is no doubt that when a tribunal is determining the
constitutionality of a law, the standard of review is correctness.30
However, she wrote that it is not clear that correctness should be used to
determine whether an administrative decision-maker has taken sufficient
account of Charter values in making a discretionary decision.31
Given the administrative decision-maker’s expertise and its
proximity to the facts of the case, Abella J. found that in the case of the
Barreau du Québec, deference was justified. She wrote, that “[e]ven
where Charter values are involved, the administrative decision-maker
will generally be in the best position to consider the impact of the
relevant Charter values on the specific facts of the case. But both
decision-makers and reviewing courts must remain conscious of the
fundamental importance of Charter values in the analysis.”32
3. An Administrative Law Proportionality Framework
On the proportionality framework, while Abella J. rejected the
“formulaic application of the Oakes test” as not workable in the context of
an adjudicated decision, “distilling its essence works the same justificatory
muscles: balance and proportionality”.33 In particular, she noted that some
29
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 33, citing David Mullan, “Administrative Tribunals and
Judicial Review of Charter Issues after Multani” (2006) 21 N.J.C.L. 127; Stéphane Bernatchez, “Les
rapports entre le droit administrative et les droits et libertés : la révision judiciaire ou le contrôle
constitutionnel” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 641.
30
Doré, id., at para. 43.
31
Id., at para. 43.
32
Id., at para. 54 (emphasis in original).
33
Id., at para. 5.
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aspects of the Oakes test are “poorly suited to the review of discretionary
decisions, whether judges or administrative decision-makers”.34
However, when one reviews the proportionality framework set out
by the Court in Doré, it is evident that the proportionality analysis from
Oakes plays a significant role: the administrative tribunal is mandated to
balance the severity of the interference with the Charter protection with
the statutory objectives:
How then does an administrative decision-maker apply Charter values
in the exercise of statutory discretion? He or she balances the Charter
values with the statutory objectives. In effecting this balancing, the
decision-maker should first consider the statutory objectives. …
Then the decision-maker should ask how the Charter value at issue
will best be protected in view of the statutory objectives. This is at the
core of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to
balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with
the statutory objectives. This is where the role of judicial review for
reasonableness aligns with the one applied in the Oakes context. …
If, in exercising its statutory discretion, the decision-maker has properly
balanced the relevant Charter value with the statutory objectives, the
35
decision will be found to be reasonable.

The framework can be broken down into three steps:
(1) the decision-maker must determine the Charter value at issue and
how it will be infringed;
(2) the decision-maker must consider the statutory objectives of the
regulatory regime; and
(3) the decision-maker must ask how the Charter value at issue will best be
protected in view of the statutory objectives. This requires balancing the
severity of the interference with the Charter value with the statutory
objective.
We now turn to a consideration of the genesis of the term Charter
values. In order to understand the role that Charter values are to play in
the administrative law context under Doré, it is useful and helpful to look
back and see how the concept of Charter values has been used and
developed in the jurisprudence up until Doré.

34
35

Id., at paras. 37-39.
Id., at paras. 55-58.
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V. THE GENESIS OF CHARTER VALUES
Prior to Doré, Charter values have been used as an interpretive tool
in two ways. First, Charter values have been used by the Court to
interpret and define the scope of Charter rights. In other words, values
have been used as the underlying principles that assist the Court in
defining the scope of a Charter right. Second, Charter values have been
used to develop the common law to ensure that the common law
develops in a manner that is consistent with the Charter.
1. Charter Values to Interpret Charter Rights
The concept of Charter values was developed for the purpose
of explaining the scope and limit of Charter rights. In R. v. Oakes,
Dickson C.J.C. identified values such as “the respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and
group identity, and faith in social and political institutions” as the genesis
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.36 In other words,
Charter values underlie Charter rights.
More recently, in Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, McLachlin C.J.C. relied on
Charter values to interpret section 2(d) as protecting the process of
collective bargaining.37 She wrote:
Protection for a process of collective bargaining within s. 2(d) is
consistent with the Charter’s underlying values. The Charter, including
s. 2(d) itself, should be interpreted in a way that maintains its
underlying values and its internal coherence.

…
Human dignity, equality, respect for autonomy of the person and the
enhancement of democracy are among the values that underlie the
Charter (citations omitted). All of these values are complemented and
indeed, promoted, by the protection of collective bargaining in s. 2(d)
38
of the Charter.

36
37
38

Oakes, supra, note 3, at para. 64.
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
Id., at paras. 80-81.

350

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

This approach sees Charter values not as something that deserves
Charter protection in and of itself. Rather, Charter values are principles
underlying the right that enables the courts to define the scope of a right,
to determine whether or not the right has been infringed and then in the
Oakes analysis to balance the extent of that infringement with the
statutory objectives.
2. Charter Values Used to Develop the Common Law
In R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,39 the Supreme
Court of Canada concluded that while the Charter does not apply to
private actors or the common law, the common law should always be
interpreted and developed in a manner consistent with the values of the
Charter.40
In R. v. Salituro,41 the Supreme Court elaborated on the importance
of interpreting the common law in accordance with Charter values. In
that case, the Crown had called the accused’s estranged wife as a witness.
The Court held that the common law rule prohibiting spouses from
testifying against each other was inconsistent with developing social
values and with the values enshrined in the Charter. Justice Iacobucci
commented as follows:
Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing
social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be
quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since
disappeared. Nonetheless, there are significant constraints on the power
of the judiciary to change the law. As McLachlin J. indicated in
Watkins, supra, in a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the
legislature and not the courts which has the major responsibility for law
reform; and for any changes to the law which may have complex
ramifications, however necessary or desirable such changes may be,
they should be left to the legislature. The judiciary should confine itself
to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common
law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society.

…

39
40
41

[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 603.
R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.).

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DORÉ: ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD

351

Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step
with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize
the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to
make it consistent with Charter values ... then the rule ought to be
42
changed.

Charter values were invoked by the Supreme Court in Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., which challenged a judge’s order
restraining the broadcast of a docudrama while a criminal trial on similar
issues was ongoing or about to start.43 The accused feared that the
program might influence jurors and thereby affect his right to a fair trial.
He obtained an order from a superior court judge prohibiting the
broadcast until the completion of the trial. The media challenged the
publication ban under section 2(b) of the Charter. Chief Justice Lamer
held that the discretion at common law to order a publication ban in
criminal proceedings must be exercised so as to conform to the Charter.
In his view, the pre-Charter common law rule favoured a right to a fair
trial over the right to freedom of expression. The protection accorded
under the Charter to freedom of expression called for a reformulation of
the common law rule.
In Hill v. Church of Scientology,44 a Crown prosecutor brought an
action against the Church of Scientology and its counsel for libel because
of various statements made about his conduct. The defendants challenged
the validity of the common law of libel, claiming that it violated their
freedom of expression. Speaking for the Court, Cory J. held that the
common law must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Charter:
Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making
those incremental changes which were necessary in order to make the
law comply with current societal values. The Charter represents a
restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape our
democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate
for the courts to make such incremental revisions to the common law as
may be necessary to have it comply with the values enunciated in the
45
Charter.

Justice Cory concluded that a traditional section 1 framework
justification is not appropriate where a conflict is alleged between
42
43
44
45

Id., at 670 and 675.
[1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.).
[1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”].
Id., at para. 92.
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Charter values and the common law. Rather, a more flexible balancing of
interests is required.
When the common law is in conflict with Charter values, how should
the competing principles be balanced? In my view, a traditional s. 1
framework for justification is not appropriate. It must be remembered
that the Charter “challenge” in a case involving private litigants does
not allege the violation of a Charter right. It addresses a conflict
between principles. Therefore, the balancing must be more flexible than
the traditional s. 1 analysis undertaken in cases involving governmental
action cases. Charter values, framed in general terms, should be
weighed against the principles which underlie the common law. The
Charter values will then provide the guidelines for any modification to
46
the common law which the court feels is necessary.

In Grant v. Torstar Corp.,47 the Court held that the traditional
common law of defamation gave inadequate weight to freedom of
expression and that greater latitude had to be given to the media when
reporting on matters of public interest. In Grant, the Chief Justice stated
the question as “whether the traditional defences for defamatory
statements of fact curtail freedom of expression in a way that is
inconsistent with Canadian Constitutional values. Does the existing law
strike an appropriate balance between two values vital to Canadian
society — freedom of expression on the one hand, and the protection of
individuals’ reputations on the other?”48
Similarly, in R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages
(West) Ltd.,49 freedom of expression was given precedence over some of
the competing interests at stake. The Court amended the common law
rules on secondary picketing so that secondary picketing is only illegal if
it involves a separate tort or a crime.
As can be seen from these cases, the use of Charter values to develop
the common law has a long pedigree stretching back to the early years of
Charter jurisprudence. However, it is important to note that while the
courts use the term “Charter values”, it is more accurate to say that they
are using Charter rights to assist in the development of the common law.
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VI. CRITIQUE OF THE DORÉ FRAMEWORK
The substance of our critique is threefold. First, we discuss the
jurisprudential and legitimacy problems that Charter values pose to
adjudicators. Second, we explore whether a reasonableness standard of
review is warranted. Third, we discuss the adjudicative practicalities that
are not resolved in Doré, such as who will have the onus on the
proportionality analysis and what will be required in terms of evidentiary
foundation.
1. The Indeterminate Scope of Charter Values and Their
Legitimacy
While setting up Charter values as the central part of the analysis in
Doré, the Supreme Court did not explore or elaborate upon the source of
those values or their boundaries.
In their paper “Charter Values and Administrative Justice”, in this
volume, Professor Lorne Sossin and Mark Friedman provide a nonexhaustive list of the Charter values which have been variously
mentioned or elaborated by courts, some of which parallel specific
Charter rights, and some of which go beyond the specific text of the
Charter. These include: liberty, human dignity, equality, autonomy,
fairness, expressive freedom and privacy.
Some of these values align with Charter rights while others, such as
human dignity, liberty, fairness and autonomy, do not neatly line up with
a corresponding Charter right. Moreover, there is very little case law that
defines the scope of these Charter values.
The Doré proportionality analysis requires defining the scope of the
Charter value. In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,50
Abella J. wrote: “In order to determine whether the measure falls within
a range of reasonable options, courts must weigh the purpose against the
extent of the infringement.”51 The extent of the infringement is informed
by the scope of the right or, in the case of Doré, the value. Without
knowing the scope of that value, the proportionality analysis is difficult if
not impossible to apply.
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In the case of Doré, the extent of the infringement on the lawyer’s
freedom of expression could be understood and balanced in the
proportionality analysis because expressive freedom is a Charter right
whose scope has been defined in the jurisprudence.52 That is not the case
for other Charter values, which do not have a corresponding Charter
right. The proportionality analysis requires as a starting point the scope
of the right or value.
As noted above, in almost all the other cases discussed above on
interpreting the common law in accordance with Charter values, a
corresponding Charter right was at issue. In Grant, the Chief Justice
discussed and outlined the core rationales and purpose of the guarantee
of free expression in section 2(b) of the Charter.53 She then discussed the
competing value of protection of reputation that underlies the law of libel
to then be able to conclude that a balanced approach to libel law properly
reflects the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant.54
In contrast, while the courts have recognized the value of respect for
human dignity as an essential value underlying the Charter guarantee of
equality, the Supreme Court itself has characterized it as an abstract and
subjective notion and acknowledged that its use as part of a legal test has
led to difficulty. In R. v. Kapp, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. wrote:
“But as critics have pointed out, human dignity is an abstract and
subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four contextual
factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also
proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants rather than the
philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.”55
In summary, we are concerned that, given the indeterminate
definition and scope of Charter values, the Doré framework may lead to
an unwieldy and unpredictable proportionality analysis. This outcome is
undesirable as, in our view, unpredictability in adjudication leads to
increased costs and risks that are borne by the litigants advancing and
defending these claims, and by the administrative law and regulatory
system as a whole. This would undermine one of the very purposes of the
system of administrative tribunals — to resolve disputes more quickly
and cheaply.

52
See, for example, Grant, supra, note 47, at paras. 47-50; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
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A related issue is that if the Court intends that Charter values extend
beyond Charter rights, then the Doré analysis raises significant concerns
from a constitutional legitimacy perspective. The rights set out in the
Charter were part of a constitutional amending process that resulted in
their adoption. The broader Charter values are principles that the Court
has looked to assist in interpreting the Charter, but are not themselves
enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982. The Doré analysis should not be
used as a method of promoting values to rights.
2. The Reasonableness Standard of Review
In Doré, the Court held that an administrative tribunal’s decision on
how it balances Charter values should be reviewed on a standard of
reasonableness. The Doré decision on standard of review is arguably at
odds with the Court’s decision in Dunsmuir, where the Court affirmed
that constitutional issues are necessarily subject to correctness review
because of the unique role of section 96 courts in interpreting the
Constitution Act, 1982.56
The anomalies that arise from applying a reasonableness standard of
review to administrative decisions where Charter values are at issue are
obvious. For example, when an appeal court reviews a decision of a
lower court where the lower court has used Charter values to interpret the
common law, the standard of review is correctness. Arguably, Superior
Court judges have at least as much if not more expertise in the
interpretation of the Charter and Charter values as administrative
decision-makers. Further, no deference is given to administrative
decision-makers in determining that a law or regulation is contrary to the
Charter. It is difficult to understand how the administrative decisionmaker’s expertise on Charter values is entitled to deference, if the
expertise to apply the Charter in a section 52 or section 24 context is not.
To understand the practical implications of the difference in the
application of the standard of review, consider a hypothetical example
from a law society hearing. If the law society passes a regulation
precluding advertising and a member of the profession challenges it as
unconstitutional as infringing upon freedom of expression, the law
society’s decision is reviewed on a standard of correctness. However, if a
panel of the law society decides that the nature or type of advertising by
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one of its members constitutes conduct unbecoming to the profession
even though it also affects the member’s freedom of expression, that
decision is reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. This would mean
that decisions that affect the body of a profession, such as in the first
example, are reviewed on a standard of correctness, while decisions that
affect an individual member are reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
Such an outcome is akin to saying that a declaration that a statute is
unconstitutional under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 should
attract a standard of review of correctness, while a decision to grant an
individual remedy under section 24 of the Charter is reviewable on a
standard of reasonableness.
Doré also does not mention the range of possible administrative
decision-makers. This should be a consideration when determining the
standard of review. Doré was decided in the context of an adjudicative
and adversarial proceeding that closely resembles a court. However,
many administrative decision-makers do not resemble a court and do not
have the same procedural safeguards that are afforded in an adversarial
proceeding. Many administrative decision-makers are simply front line
administrative staff such as customs officers.
While Doré addressed the standard of review of an adjudicative
administrative tribunal, the Quebec Court of Appeal in Québec
(Procureur general) v. Loyola High School extended this reasoning to a
minister’s decision where the discretionary character of the decision has
been recognized.57 In that case, the decision at issue was that of the
Minister of Education. Loyola, a private Catholic high school in Quebec,
had asked the Minister to be exempted from teaching a mandatory course
on ethics and religious culture. The Minister had declined the request.
The deferential standard of review in Doré surely needs to be
revisited when other administrative decision-makers who do not have a
court-like process or do not have expertise, such as a minister, are
making discretionary decisions based on Charter values that have a
serious impact on applicants.
One possible approach to consider would be to bifurcate the standard of
review to recognize the respective expertise of courts and administrative
decision-makers. On identifying the Charter value and defining its scope,
administrative decision-makers would be subject to a correctness standard of
review as this is within the realm of expertise of the courts. However, on the
57
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application of the Charter value to the factual and legislative context, the
administrative decision-maker would be accorded deference. This
recognizes the administrative decision-maker’s expertise with the enabling
statute and that he or she is best placed to make the findings of fact.
3. Practical Problems: Onus and Evidentiary Foundation
While arguably borrowing from the Oakes proportionality analysis,
the Supreme Court in Doré did not address how the framework would
operate in practice. The Supreme Court did not address: (1) who will
carry the burden; and (2) what types of evidence will be required.
In the traditional Oakes analysis, after an applicant has demonstrated
that a Charter right has been infringed, it is up to the Attorney General to
demonstrate that the infringement is justified. In contrast, when interpreting
the common law to be consistent with Charter values, the Supreme Court
held in Hill that the shift of onus which normally operates in a Charter
challenge to government action does not apply. Justice Cory wrote:
This is not a situation in which one party must prove a prima facie
violation of a right while the other bears the onus of defending it. Rather,
the party who is alleging that the common law is inconsistent with the
Charter should bear the onus of proving both that the common law fails to
comply with Charter values and that, when these values are balanced, the
common law should be modified. In the ordinary situation, where
government action is said to violate a Charter right, it is appropriate that the
government undertake the justification for the impugned statute or
common law rule. However, the situation is very different where two
private parties are involved in a civil suit. One party will have brought the
action on the basis of the prevailing common law which may have a long
history of acceptance in the community. That party should be able to rely
upon that law and should not be placed in the position of having to defend
it. It is up to the party challenging the common law to bear the burden of
proving not only that the common law is inconsistent with Charter values
58
but also that its provisions cannot be justified.

However, in R.W.D.S.U., Local 558,59 which dealt with the common
law rule on secondary picketing, the Supreme Court took a different
approach on where the onus lies. The Court had to interpret and apply the
value of freedom of expression to the common law rules on secondary
58
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picketing. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he starting point must be
freedom of expression. Limitations are permitted, but only to the extent
that this is shown to be reasonable and demonstrably necessary in a free
and democratic society.”60
It is unclear which approach applies in the Doré framework. While the
Court noted in Doré that the issue arises in the Oakes analysis and it cited its
decision in Hill, it did not provide a solution for the administrative law
context. Justice Abella wrote: “[W]hen exercising discretion under a
provision or statutory scheme whose constitutionality is not impugned, it is
conceptually difficult to see what the ‘pressing and substantial’ objective of
a decision is, or who would have the burden of defining and defending it.”61
We can surmise from her reasons that Abella J. favours the approach
adopted in Hill and therefore after that the party challenging the decision
should bear the burden of proving that the administrative tribunal’s decision
was not made in accordance with Charter values.
Moreover, it will not always be the case that the Attorney General or
the government will be a party to the administrative proceeding. To the
contrary, the Attorney General’s presence may be the exception instead
of the rule. For example, in Slaight, the adjudication was between the
employee and the company. The question becomes who in such a
proceeding leads evidence on the purpose of the statute in order to enable
the administrative tribunal to conduct the proportionality analysis.
A further practical problem is the question of whether an applicant
needs to serve a notice of constitutional question. If an application to
judicially review an administrative tribunal’s decision is brought on the
ground that the tribunal’s decision infringed on Charter values, it is not
clear whether the applicant would have to serve a notice of constitutional
question.
Certain tribunals have incorporated a process on how to address
constitutional rights in their adjudication while others may be unprepared to
address these issues. For example, the Rules of Procedure of the Ontario
Review Board provide that where there is an allegation that the
constitutional rights or freedoms of an accused have been violated and a
remedy is sought, the party seeking the remedy must provide notice of its
intention to make such argument no less than 15 days prior to the hearing.62
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However, other tribunals, especially ones where the parties are often
unrepresented, may face greater challenges in adjudicating these issues.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Doré resolves the disparate strands
of jurisprudence on how an administrative tribunal should make a
decision in accordance with Charter values by balancing the statutory
objectives against the interference with the Charter value at issue.
However, serious questions arise as to whether this framework will be
workable in practice. Specifically, administrative tribunals may be faced
with attempting to balance Charter values that have as of yet been
undefined. Added to this concern is a deferential standard of review that
in our view is not warranted. Moreover, it is not clear how this
adjudication will proceed in practice. It appears from Doré that the onus
will lie on the litigants advancing their Charter rights, but in a private
administrative law dispute, it may put the respondent in a difficult
position to advocate for the objectives of the statute and how those
should properly be balanced against the Charter values. The Court needs
to take a sober second look at this issue with a view to narrowing and
defining the concept.
We suggest the following approach to adjudicating whether an
administrative tribunal exercised its discretion in accordance with
Charter values. First, only Charter values that have a corresponding
Charter right should be recognized and adjudicated. This allows
administrative tribunals and the parties to rely on a solid body of
jurisprudence in defining the right at issue. Second, we suggest that the
standard of review of correctness apply to the review of a tribunal’s
definition and scope of a Charter right or value. Only the tribunal’s
application of Charter values should be granted deference. Constrained
as we suggest, Charter values can play a useful role in the exercise of
administrative discretion.

